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Evaluating Innovative Health Programs:
Lessons for Health Policy
ABSTRACT
The Global Development Network’s (GDN) project “Evaluating Innovative Health Programs”
(EIHP), funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, seeks to inform policy on the
effectiveness of health solutions that have the potential to improve health outcomes in
developing countries. It evaluates the impact of nineteen programs from across developing and
transition countries that focus on the health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of
reducing child and maternal mortality, and halting and reversing the trend of communicable
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. The policy implications of the diverse
set of interventions are distinguished between programs that involved earmarking resources,
changing incentives, and developing innovative methods of health care delivery.4
Introduction
Despite billions of dollars channeled to developing countries over the last few decades, Africa
and Asia remain amongst the poorest regions in the world with the greatest number of people
living in absolute poverty [1]. Poor health outcomes are associated with poverty, as limited
resources for consumption of necessities results in inadequate or no investment in health. Almost
half of all under-five deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa and almost 86% of maternal deaths
occur in Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa while other diseases such as malaria cost Africa
an estimated $12 billion annually and remain a major factor in the erosion of development in
some of the poorest countries in the world
1. These health indicators reflect the critical need to
address the health situations in these regions.
Against this background the Global Development Network’s (GDN) project “Evaluating
Innovative Health Programs” (EIHP), funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, evaluates
the impact of nineteen programs from across developing and transition countries. Each of these
programs address one or more of the health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of
reducing child and maternal mortality, and halting and reversing the trend of communicable
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
The project provides a critical link in the chain connecting international aid and outcomes. This
effort requires identifying from across various countries innovative solutions which are relevant
for Africa and Asia, evaluating these solutions using rigorous quantitative techniques to measure
their impact, and promoting those with successful outcomes for implementation in these regions.
1 Millennium Development Goals Report, 2008, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.5
In its portfolio a range of programs are covered, including national programs and small scale
non-governmental programs and both supply and demand-side interventions (Table 1). These
programs can be classified based on their economic rationale for implementation – earmarking
resources to specific issues, changing incentives for health service users or providers and
applying innovative delivery mechanisms. This paper brings together the lessons from the
evaluations in terms of the program design and objectives and looks at the policy messages from
each category of program.
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
Earmarking Resources to Specific Issues: Maternal and Child Health Care
According to the World Health Organization, more than half a million maternal deaths occur
annually worldwide and nearly two million children die each year from vaccine-preventable
diseases. These problems are especially severe in Asia and Africa (a mother in Sub-Saharan
Africa for example faces a life-time risk of death of 1 in 26 compared with 1 in 7,300 in
developed countries). It’s not surprising therefore that several of the interventions included in
this project focus on various aspects of maternal and child health care and family planning. The
programs considered in this sub-section demonstrate what can be achieved even in resource-
scarce environments provided resources are well directed.
Table 2 shows the huge range in costs per person per year for maternal health care programs for
three interventions for which cost information is available. The difference in inputs implied by
these costs is marked. Compare the effort mounted in the Brazilian Family Health Program [2]6
and the Ethiopian Health Services Extension Program [3]. The former delivers basic health care
through professional teams composed of, at least, one family doctor, a nurse, an assistant nurse,
and six health community agents. In some cases, teams also include a dentist, an assistant dentist,
and a dental hygiene technician. Each team serves about 3,000 to 4,500 people. In sharp
contrast, the latter assigns to every rural Kebele, the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia, two
health extension workers to deliver primary health care services to households. The extension
workers are 10
th grade graduates who have been trained for about one year to deliver basic health
care services. They are expected to cover a population of about 5,000.
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE
The Brazilian program was expanded from a minor pilot in selected areas in 1994 to a
nationwide program in 2006 covering more than 90% of Brazilian municipalities By 2005, Brazil
was spending US$ 1,175 million on the program. Such a massive injection of resources need not
necessarily yield commensurate benefits. The Brazilian program however seems to have been
highly successful. The impact evaluation finds that for municipalities eight years into the
program infant mortality is reduced by 20%, mortality in the 1 to 4 age group by 25%, and in the
15 to 59 age group by 8.5%. Furthermore, analysis reveals important non-health benefits. In the
two poorest regions of the country, the program results in greater labor supply (a 6.8 percentage
point increase for adults between 18 and 55), higher school enrollment (a 4.5 percentage point
increase for children between 10 and 17), and reduced fertility (a 4.6 percentage point reduction
in the probability that women aged between 18 and 55 experience a birth over a given 21 month
interval).7
It is unlikely that the success of the Brazilian program can be repeated for the time being in low-
income, resource-constrained countries in Africa and Asia, the focus of this project. The
Ethiopian program may therefore provide a more realistic indication of likely benefits in such
environments. The program currently reaches about 57% of the rural villages in the country and
is intended to deliver a range of services including maternal and child health care, immunization,
nutrition, adolescent reproductive health, water and sanitation, malaria prevention and control,
and health education. Its impact is much more nuanced than in the Brazilian case. Favourable
effects were registered for preventive types of health care services especially child immunization
against tuberculosis, polio, diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus and measles. In contrast, the program
has not reduced the incidence of diarrhoea among children. The authors note that this may
reflect the program’s low quality of curative health services or increased understanding of the
disease’s symptoms as a result of the program. The program’s effect on maternal health is also
mixed. While pregnant women in the program villages made their first contact with a skilled
health service provider significantly earlier than their counterparts in the control villages, the
program did not have a statistically significant effect on prenatal and postnatal care service
indicators.
The China Safe Motherhood Program looks even cheaper [4]. With an average annual
incremental cost for the program of US$39,800 per county (average population of about
300,000), the cost per person is less than 15 cents. Care should be taken, however, in comparing
costs across programs. The estimate for the Chinese program for example excludes salaries for
local health staff and other routine costs not directly attributable to the program. The program
concentrated on three measures to improve hospital delivery: health education, better health8
infrastructure, and social mobilization, and featured two innovations – demand-side
reimbursement in which pregnant women receive subsidies directly from local government, and
the temporary assignment of obstetric experts from provincial tertiary hospitals to primary
maternal care centers. The results are impressive. After seven years of participation in the
program, the hospital delivery rate improved by 3.99 per 100 live births and the maternal
mortality ratio due to hemorrhaging declined by 10.23 per 100 live births. The results suggest
that even modest sums can have a significant impact provided resources are effectively directed.
This last comment points to the critical importance of careful economic analysis and health
research before committing limited resources, the central message of this sub-section. The
Mother and Infant Health Program in Ukraine is a good example [5]. Since basic prenatal and
obstetrics care is already universally available in Ukraine, the program focused its efforts on
improving the quality of the provided services. Beyond this general orientation, the program
introduced new evidence-based medicine standards such as partner deliveries; avoidance of
unnecessary C-sections, amniotomies, and episiotomies; use of free position during delivery;
immediate skin-to-skin contact; early breastfeeding; and rooming-in of mothers and newborns.
It also actively supported training on effective perinatal technologies, development of “centers of
excellence” that serve as models in training/education of medical practitioners, and health
awareness campaigns. Even more impressively, it encouraged the revision of current curricula at
medical universities and colleges in order to increase the evidence base of educational programs
for medical students and health care providers.
The impact evaluation finds that women in the participating rayons are more likely to have
normal deliveries and less likely to have C-sections. They are also likely to suffer fewer9
complications arising from anemia, problems with blood circulation, veins, urinary-genital
conditions and late toxicosis. The program also significantly reduces infant mortality and
stillbirths resulting from deviations in prenatal period and congenital anomalies.
Most countries in Africa and Asia may not have the basic prenatal and obstetrics care that were
the starting point for the Ukraine program, but the PARSalud Program in Peru also illustrates the
value of careful, pre-implementation analysis but this time in a low-income country [6]. The
intervention was based on a “causality model” that attacked the sources of maternal mortality
and morbidity. PARSalud identified three main causes of maternal mortality: pre- and post-
partum bleeding, eclampsia-preclampsia, and obstetric emergencies requiring cesarean surgery.
However, since the latter two required major reforms (personnel certification, specific equipment
and infrastructure), the program focused on post-partum bleeding. Specifically, it promoted
active management of the third stage of labor, involving use of oxytocin to prevent post-partum
bleeding.
The impact evaluation reveals a positive impact of the training provided by the program on the
number of deliveries, deliveries using oxytocin, cesarean deliveries, and complicated deliveries,
but no impact resulting from the infrastructure investments. Also, different types of training had
different impacts, internships on perinatal technologies having the most positive impact. The
authors conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis. They find that, using their estimates of additional
deliveries assisted with oxytocin, the costs per averted case of postpartum hemorrhage are
reasonable (US$3,328).10
The final intervention in this sub-section, the Family Planning Program in Iran, provides
valuable guidance for the implementation of such programs in rural areas [7]. In 1989 the
government launched a major family planning program for rural families based on active
delivery of services through health houses where health workers not only supplied maternal and
child health services on a regular basis, they also kept close track of birth control needs of
individual women: if a woman was on the pill, for instance, the health worker would make sure
that she had her monthly supply on time. In comparison villages, on the other hand, all married
women had access to free birth control devices at their own discretion through mobile units and
government health facilities in nearby towns. By 2005, the program covered more than 90
percent of the rural population and the average number of births per rural woman had declined to
replacement level from about 8 births in the mid 1980s. The results of the impact evaluation,
however, reveal that less than 15 percent of this decline can be attributed to the family planning
services provided through health houses. This conclusion is perhaps not surprising given
evidence from other countries. In the case of Iran, the fertility decline started in the mid 1980s
several years before implementation of the program, suggesting, as in other countries, that other
factors such as education and reduced infant mortality may have been influential in lowering
fertility and in this case also by government propaganda and policy pronouncements (rationing
of many basic commodities which depended on the number of children in a family was
terminated)..
That said, costs of this program (not reported) may have been equally modest since the health
houses would have been constructed any way. The message to take away is probably that public11
programs to supply contraceptives have limited benefits and can, therefore, be justified only if
costs are correspondingly limited.
The interventions considered in this sub-section confirm that improvements in maternal and child
health status can be achieved in low-income environments. The benefits may not reach the
levels attained in the Brazilian Family Health Program, but then the resources (funds and
personnel) are unlikely to be available in most African and Asian countries on the scale of the
project in Brazil. The Ethiopian Health Services Extension Program, China’s Safe Mother
Program and PARSalud in Peru provide a better guide for policy-makers and are more indicative
of what can be achieved. More fundamentally, the evidence underscores the importance of
‘looking before you leap’ especially where resources are scarce. The PARSalud program in
particular demonstrates that careful consideration of needs and of what can be achieved can be
crucial in increasing the prospects of a successful intervention.
Changing Incentives for Health-Service Providers or Users
Compared with interventions designed to deliver additional resources to address a specific health
issue, those that primarily involve a change in incentives for providers or users of health services
would seem to have a natural advantage – they are seemingly resource-free or at least they are
less resource-intensive. This is indeed an important, potential advantage of incentive-changing
interventions, but, before potential becomes reality, several conditions must be fulfilled as the
programs reviewed in this sub-section make clear. To be effective, programs that change
incentives must meet three conditions, each of which has implications for costs: the change in
incentives must be of sufficient magnitude to change behavior; it must be well targeted; and it12
must be subject to transparent and independent monitoring. The six programs examined in this
sub-section illustrate these three points.
Consider the Safe Motherhood Hospital Program in Thailand [8]. This program covers the
introduction of a range of actions including training, standardized child delivery services and
vaccination designed to improve the health of women before, during and after pregnancy. The
program is implemented by means of an evaluation conducted by the Department of Health or
Provincial Public Health Office. Directors of hospitals can choose to participate or not.
However, they are neither rewarded, with additional budget for example, in the event of a
successful evaluation, nor penalized if they fail to maintain the standards required by the
program. Indeed, it’s not clear that the participating hospitals are subject to any routine
monitoring with respect to the prescribed actions.
As of 2005, almost all of the provincial hospitals and 63 percent of all hospitals had successfully
completed the evaluation. This achievement notwithstanding, the impact evaluation finds no
reduction in the proportion of maternal deaths to child deliveries. The evidence suggests that the
failure to implement incentives with ‘bite’ and to conduct rigorous, independent monitoring, left
hospital directors free to undergo the Department of Health’s evaluation and yet still manage
their hospital’s resources without necessarily following the guidelines. The intervention relied
on exhortation or moral persuasion to implement change, and overworked hospital directors with
insufficient resources only paid lip-serve to the program.13
Now consider the Program of Performance-based Contracts implemented in Rwanda [9]. As in
the Thai example, no additional resources are provided to public health clinics participating in
this program compared with those in the control group, but incentives are markedly different
between the two and implementation is rigorously monitored. Given that the priority of the
Rwandan Ministry of Health is to improve maternal and child health, the performance indicators
are prescribed standards in the areas of prenatal care, neonatal care, postnatal and new born care,
immunization, delivery by skilled attendants, family planning, VCT, as well as ART when
available. Clinics in the treatment group receive additional budget according to their
performance against the benchmarks, while those in the control receive an equivalent budget
without any requirement to meet targets. Performance is monitored through independent
municipal level steering committees which verifies data, certifies targets are met, and arranges
payments, all of which imply administrative costs. A full evaluation of the Rwandan program,
therefore, would have to consider the costs incurred by these administrative activities. The
evaluation on health outcomes finds that compared with the control group, the treatment group
performed much better with respect to the selected targets, illustrating the power of incentives
that have bite and are carefully monitored.
The Rwandan program demonstrates the potential of well defined, rigorously monitored
performance-related incentives: the same amount of resources can be used to achieve different
outcomes depending on the way in which incentives are set.
In contrast, many programs that change incentives, especially for users, require increased
resources to achieve the desired outcome. This point is revealed clearly by the three insurance14
programs in the sample: the Social Security Health Insurance Program in Nicaragua [10], the
Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme [11], and the ‘Yeshasvini’ Community Based Health
Insurance Program in India [12].
First, a word about each of these schemes. In January 2007, the government of Nicaragua
initiated a demonstration project that extended the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute’s health
insurance program to informal sector workers. In this context, ‘informal sector workers’ should
be interpreted as self-employed entrepreneurs and businessmen rather than as casual laborers and
street hawkers. Indeed, the respondents in the survey had an average monthly income of almost
$240 compared with a national average of approximately $140. In contrast, Ghana’s National
Heath Insurance Scheme introduced in 2003 is, as its name indicates, a national program
designed to make health care services affordable to all and to ultimately replace the existing
“cash-and-carry” system. It covers about 95 percent of common diseases, only a handful of
specialized services, such as HIV antiretroviral drugs, VIP accommodations etc., being excluded
from the package. Perhaps most interesting of the three is the Yeshasvini Insurance Scheme
operating in the Indian state of Karnataka. This innovative program allows individuals to insure
against low probability, high-cost health events, mainly surgical procedures, the cost of which
could be prohibitive or catastrophic for poor households.
All three programs pool risks: an individual can choose between the fixed premium incurred by
being in the scheme versus the uncertainty of a costly medical problem if not insured. This
change in incentives may be sufficient to ensure that an insurance program achieves broad
coverage. There are, however, at least two hurdles. In some situations, individuals may judge15
the (unsubsidized) insurance scheme too expensive compared to their expected health
expenditures; and in other situations, individuals may just be too poor to pay the full-cost
premium. Table 3 shows the standard premium for each of these schemes and the extent to
which the program is subsidized by the government.
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
The Nicaraguan pilot study illustrates the first case. The authors of the impact evaluation note
that out-of-pocket health expenditures in the preceding year were $88 on average, considerably
less than the unsubsidized cost of the insurance ($176), suggesting potentially low willingness-
to-pay for this particular insurance plan. There is strong evidence to this effect. Sign-up was
encouraged by offering insurance free of charge for six months, as a result of which those
offered the subsidy were about 30 percentage points more likely to take up insurance than those
receiving no subsidy. Less than 10 percent of those who enrolled, however, were still paying for
insurance once the subsidy was withdrawn. The sign-up subsidy implied an average saving of
$88, an attractive and powerful incentive, but the full-cost of the program per member at $176
proved too expensive compared with expected health costs of only half that amount.
The Nicaragua program was aimed at individuals with above-average incomes but still could not
attract many takers, suggesting the need for at least some subsidy. The other two insurance
programs are intended to attract enrollees in much lower-income populations and both incurred
subsidies. Against this, both achieved significant health benefits. Thus, in the case of Ghana,
maternal health care, the focus of the impact evaluation, improved significantly: compared with16
their uninsured counterparts, enrolled women were more likely to give birth in hospitals; 15.8 per
cent more were attended by trained health professionals at the time of delivery; 15 per cent more
received prenatal care; 2.1 per cent had fewer birth complications, and 1.8 per cent experienced
fewer infant deaths. Similarly, insured cohorts in the Yeshasvini program reported more surgery
cases than the uninsured ones during the 4 years of the evaluation but, at the same time,
experienced significantly less indebtedness and sale of assets indicating the program not only
improved health status but also protected economic status. These two programs point to the
potential, and the fiscal cost, the subsidy required to attract enrollees, for successful insurance
programs in low-income situations.
Insurance programs can be delivered with or without a subsidy. In some other programs,
however, the incentive only emerges as a result of a subsidy. The Program of Conditional Cash
Transfers in Zomba district, Malawi, for example, creates an incentive for never married young
women in the age group of 13 to 22 years to stay in school, or return to school, by offering a cash
transfer to cover school fees (or paying the fees directly) conditional on satisfactory school
attendance [13]. International evidence suggests that such transfers can improve school
attendance. The Malawi impact evaluation goes beyond this to see if there is any impact on the
sexual behavior of the young women which in turn could reduce the incidence of HIV: the
transfer may motivate girls to avoid pregnancy so that they finish school; it may reduce women’s
need to engage in transactional sex; and it may also increase their bargaining power in their
current and future relationships. The results confirm such an impact. The program led to
significant increases in schooling among drop-outs (those who were not attending school at
baseline but returned to school once the transfer was offered) and enrolled school girls (their17
remaining in school). It also finds significant declines in early marriage, teenage pregnancy, and
sexual activity among program beneficiaries after just one year of program implementation. The
effects, however, were mainly observed among drop-outs: the program reduced their likelihood
to be married by approximately 40% and to start childbearing by more than 30%.
These promising results come at a cost in the form of the transfer. The young women are paid a
range between $5-$10/month which represents roughly 15% of total monthly household
consumption for sample households at baseline, a significant transfer, placing this program in the
middle-to-high end of the range for transfers in such schemes. If the impact of the program on
sexual behavior is found mainly among drop-outs, then for the remainder of the young women,
those who would have stayed in school without the subsidy, the $5-$10 is a transfer that only
affects schooling. According to the authors, their sampling procedure led to an average sample
size of 5.1 dropouts and 16.6 current school girls at baseline in each Enumeration Area. For the
enrolled school-girls, therefore, the cash is serving to increase school enrollment with no change
in sexual behavior (in fact, the proportion in the population is higher because the sample
included all drop-outs). This highlights the importance of targeting in conditional cash transfer
programs. In the short-term at least this non-targeted CCT program is unlikely to be cost-
effective. However, behavioral changes could take longer to manifest in the evaluation results.
The experiment is scheduled to run for another year to analyze long term schooling and
behavioral changes. A full cost-effectiveness analysis including long term health outcomes may
be able to provide more in-sight into the cost-effectiveness and need for targeting in such a
program.18
In addition to the issue of how lack of precision in targeting may increase the cost of incentive-
based interventions, the Zomba Conditional Cash Transfer Program raises a further cost-related
issue. The total cost of the program consists of the cash transfers themselves and the
administrative costs of running the program. For every $1 that is transferred to a program
beneficiary, approximately $0.50 is spent on administration (delivering the cash payments and
monitoring attendance). The authors note that these costs may be lower if the program is
implemented by the government and fully integrated into its administrative structure, but, even
so, the fact remains that incentive-based programs typically involve administrative costs that
have to be considered in any full evaluation.
The seemingly costless change in incentives for users in the Provider-Initiated Voluntary HIV
Counseling and Testing Program in Thailand also incurs administrative expenses [14]. In this
program, clients at participating hospitals were provided with HIV counseling and testing unless
they specifically chose to opt-out, whereas the traditional approach, opting-in, was continued in
the control hospitals. This apparently simple change in incentives had a significant impact: the
acceptance rate for HIV testing and the HIV detection rate were significantly higher in the
treatment hospitals. The costs of the intervention, capital, labor and materials required to offer
the service (pre- and post-test counseling, and HIV testing) however, were substantial (three
times higher in the treatment hospitals). Even so, the authors calculate that incremental costs
per HIV infection averted as a result of provider-initiated VCT were PPP $28,551, a not-
excessive cost-effectiveness ratio.19
In sum, the incentive-based schemes reviewed here show substantial promise and such
approaches should be high on the policy-maker’s agenda. The cautionary tales about costs
recounted above are just that: cautionary tales. Incentives have to be well-defined to have an
impact on behavior; subsidies must be well targeted; and allowance must be made for adequate
monitoring. International experience can provide useful guidance on the cost implications of
different programs, but pre-intervention economic analysis may also contribute. Thus, knowing
the out-of-pocket costs of businessmen in Nicaragua may have been sufficient to indicate the
likely (minimal) impact of relatively high-cost insurance. Similarly, examining the incentives, or
lack thereof, in the Thai Safe Motherhood Hospital Program should have given some indication
of likely impact.
Innovative Delivery Systems for Health Services
Delivery mechanisms can play a crucial role in improving health status. The latest ‘miracle’
drug will be of little value if it fails to reach those it is intended to benefit. Programs aiming to
increase the prospects of successful delivery of preventive care and treatment often make use of
the existing infrastructure for other non-health, public services to provide health services. The
hoped-for economic benefit behind these schemes is that they save on the costs of investing in
health-specific infrastructure for delivery. At the same time, they run the danger of diverting the
non-health delivery system from its primary purpose. Three of the examples in this sub-section
illustrate this trade-off with specific reference to the use of schools in delivering health
programs. The other three examples report on genuinely innovative attempts to deliver health
services. Precisely because they are more experimental in nature, they offer new exciting20
possibilities while posing searching questions with respect to acceptance by the target
population.
The three programs making use of schools to deliver health services are concerned with hand
washing to combat diarrheal diseases and respiratory infections, treatment kits for malaria, and
teacher training for HIV/AIDS education. The first intervention uses alcohol-based hand
sanitizers for the prevention of acute diarrheal disease and acute respiratory infection in children
under 5 attending childcare centers in Bogotá, Cundinamarca and Tolima, Colombia [15]. These
centers lack access to tap water for hand-washing and the hand sanitizers offer a simple
alternative. The second intervention, the School-Based Malaria Program in Mangochi district,
Malawi, involves training primary school teachers in presumptive management of malaria cases
among students [16]. The teachers are trained to diagnose malaria and other health problems on
the basis of signs and symptoms according to the national protocol and to dispense medicine
from specially prepared Pupil Treatment Kits. The third intervention entails a formal change in
the school curriculum. The Cameroonian government with support from UNESCO is currently
introducing a teaching module devoted to HIV/AIDS (information on prevention, transmission
mechanisms, and other issues linked to HIV/AIDS) into its school curriculum [17]. The module
was introduced integrating it with five disciplines – language (French and English), civic
education, history and geography, physical education and life sciences. In each participating
school nine teachers from the five disciplines were chosen to be trained in the module. The
module is targeted at children between ages 12-17.21
Based on the evaluations, these three programs have much to offer. Two of them, the hand-
sanitizers in Colombia and the pupil treatment kits in Malawi, are shown to have produced
positive impacts at reasonable cost with relatively little encroachment into teaching time. Thus,
the former program reduced at a relatively modest incremental cost ($1.42 per child per school
year in the control group using soap and water versus between $3.42 and $5.16 using the hand-
sanitizer). This improvement came at little additional cost in terms of teacher time required to
supervise hand washing. In the control group, the reported median frequency of hand washing
with water and soap was 3 times a day compared to 6.5 times a day with the hand sanitizers in
the intervention group. Similarly, in the School-based Malaria Project significant improvements
were reported in repetition and drop-out rates in treated schools. The mean number of days
pupils were sick, however, was higher in treated schools than in the control ones, a result
attributed by the authors to better reporting of sick cases in the treated schools. Nevertheless,
the mean number of days absent from school was significantly higher in control schools than in
the treated ones and a cost-benefit analysis based solely on the reduced repetition rates was
positive. Moreover, teachers reported that no more than an average of 5 minutes was required
for diagnosis and treatment per child. It is unlikely therefore that either of these programs
significantly impacted the time available for teaching.
The HIV/AIDS Education Program in Cameroon, on the other hand, will, when fully
implemented into the school curriculum, reduce time for teaching other subjects. The evaluation
reported here cannot, unfortunately, address this issue because at the time of the study’s survey
in December 2007-January 2008 the new school curriculum had not yet been introduced. Rather,
the study takes advantage of the fact that about half of the children in the sample had been22
exposed to ten months of teaching by teachers who had followed the teacher training program.
The evaluation finds that students aged 15-17 receive about one half hour extra teaching time
per week on HIV/AIDS topics in comparison to non-participating schools. The results on the
health and related outcomes are promising especially for 15-17 year olds. For example, boys and
girls in this age group having a trained teacher are 55% and 53% more likely to have used a
condom during their last sexual intercourse and are 5% and 10% more likely to have carried out
an HIV test.
The three remaining interventions are much more than “add-on’s” to existing delivery
mechanisms, important though those may be. They are innovative attempts to develop new
mechanisms for delivering health services. Given the nature of the product being delivered –
health services – issues of reputation and client satisfaction are always present but are especially
critical in the case of new delivery vehicles. Two of the interventions -- Building the
Reproductive Health Capacity of the Commune Health Network Project in Khanh Hoa Province
and Da Nang City, Vietnam [18], and Micro-franchising and the Distribution of Anti-malarial
Drugs in Kenya [19] – illustrate the importance of establishing client confidence in the new
delivery mechanism.
The Vietnamese intervention was intended to turn around the widespread perception of low
quality health services at commune health stations (unqualified health staff, outdated equipment,
and limited drugs and supplies). Based on a "needs assessment" conducted in 2006, the
government introduced a social franchising model, in which a franchised facility seeks to provide
a uniform set of reproductive health and family planning services under its brand name with
predefined quality of care and costs. A key aspect of this effort was the time devoted to23
generating confidence in the new model. The brand-name, Tinh Chi Em (Sisterhood), adopted
following consultation with the target population, emphasized the empowerment of women and
conveyed a sense of closeness, friendliness, sharing, and caring. Several workshops were held to
achieve "buy-in" of the standardized franchise program from stakeholders during the pre-launch
period. At the same time, extensive external marketing activities including road shows, media
tours of the social franchise network and dissemination in the media were undertaken. These
marketing efforts were designed to "look and feel similar" to cultural and social events in which
Vietnamese women and their families already participated in order to attract larger numbers of
potential clients.
To be a member of the social franchise and have the right to use the brand name, participating
commune health stations had to upgrade building facilities and waiting areas, enroll in the
service quality evaluation program, and ensure that all staff undertook social marketing training
(customer relationship management, service quality evaluation, financial sustainability and social
marketing and branding) and instruction on reproductive health and family planning service
delivery and that all medical staff received specialized training on quality of care and clinical
training. The results of the impact evaluation indicate that the approach has produced positive
outcomes with respect to service utilization, client satisfaction, and client perceptions of service
quality in several ways: the assessment of residents within the catchment area of the stations
improved significantly for both service quality and staff expertise; client satisfaction was
significantly higher; client likeliness to return increased; and so did their likeliness to
recommend the commune health station to others. The program appears to have changed
perceptions regarding the quality of health care provided by the commune health stations, but it24
will require more time before improvements in health status can be confirmed. The care taken in
setting up this program – the needs assessment, the consultation, the marketing – may well have
been key to its initial success and points to the importance of checking client interest
beforehand and advertizing as much as possible when introducing new delivery vehicles.
The Kenyan Drug Distribution Scheme provides a good example of effectively reaching its
target population – rural villagers – through a careful consideration of local context. The
government in partnership with the Sustainable Healthcare Foundation initiated in 2005 an
innovative way of increasing access to a more effective anti-malaria drug called Coartem
™using
a micro-franchise system. The medicines are provided by the government to the Foundation
through a central procurement government body and distributed to the rural poor through the
Foundation’s network of individual and privately-owned shops branded as Child and Family
Wellness shops. The shops receive the drugs free from the Foundation, and they in turn give the
medicine to the patients at no cost, but charge a minimal screening fee ($0.25). The shop owners
enter a franchise agreement with the Foundation covering procurement, medical and business
best practices including diagnostics, record keeping and general management of the shops.
Regular monitoring reinforced by surprise inspections and investigations ensures that every
outlet is operating to standard.
The results show that the introduction of the program has had a negative and significant impact
on malaria morbidity: an additional outlet giving free Coartem
™ is found to reduce malaria
morbidity by 247 cases in the treated sub-locations. The authors attribute this success in part to
three features. First, the shop owners are private businessmen who want to attract more patients25
to their clinics to increase the number of screening fees. Second, effective and prompt service
and reduced negligence are encouraged by the strict monitoring and supervision. And third, the
shops offer a more personalized service and advice to patients in their local languages,
something that the patients do not get at government hospitals. In sum, the program seems to
have found an attractive combination of private enterprise, government regulation, and cultural
sensitivity. The interest in this program is greatly increased by noting that if this method of drug
distribution is effective in increasing access to Coartem
™, other essential drugs could be
distributed to the rural poor through similar mechanisms.
Compared with the Kenyan program, the final intervention in this group – the Young Medical
Volunteers Program in Vietnam [20] – replaces the profit motive with youthful zeal. From 2002
to 2005, 545 recent medical graduates volunteered to conduct primary health checks and
treatment, organize training in primary health care, and implement national programs with
respect to vaccination, nutrition, malaria prevention, family planning, and SARS prevention in
the Northern Mountains and the Central Highland where access to health services is most
difficult. Provincial project management units coordinated volunteer activities, ensured logistics
and organized monthly monitoring meetings of the teams. Many of the volunteers were able to
speak the ethnic language spoken by the community they were serving.
The impact evaluation, conducted in 2008, revealed a mixed picture. Prenatal and postnatal care
was better for the treated group but the indicator of hygienic behavior (household use of boiled
water for drinking) and the incidence of diarrhea were worse (possibly due to a breakout of acute
diarrhea at that time). While the evaluation’s focus was the intervention’s health impact, it might26
also be worth considering its impact on recruitment of health personnel for remote regions.
Indeed the authors note that no systemic effort has been made to attract personnel to these areas
where their service is most needed. Of the 545 volunteers in this program, 444 of them were
recruited by the provincial health department on a long-term basis with some of them opting to
continue their career in the same project area. Of course, by definition, the volunteers self-
selected, but even so this result, and economic logic, suggests that a more focused attempt to
make service in remote areas more attractive could be an effective means of improving health
service in these locations.
Policy-makers seeking new ways of delivering health services can learn much from the six
programs reviewed here. Two lessons stand out. First, if the intervention makes use of an
existing delivery mechanism (typically schools), care should be taken to ensure that the
additional, health-related demand does not crowd out the primary service being provided.
Crowding-out seems unlikely in two of the programs considered here – Hand Sanitizers in
Colombia and Pupil Treatment Kits in Malawi. Moreover, both of these programs address
widespread, health issues (diarrhea and respiratory diseases in Colombia and malaria in Malawi).
This comment, however, should not be understood to mean that all crowding-out be discouraged.
The HIV/AIDS Education Program in Cameroon will definitely crowd out teaching time for
other purposes when the new component is fully introduced into the school curriculum. But
reaching teenagers and young adults, a potentially high-risk group, with information on how to
prevent the spread of the epidemic may well be a high-return activity. If the intervention is a
new delivery mechanism then conducting focus groups to test acceptance before implementation,
educating the target population regarding what to expect, and supervising the program to ensure27
that delivery meets required standards are all highly desirable. The successful programs – Social
Franchising in Vietnam and Micro-franchising for Drug Distribution in Kenya – illustrate many
of these points.
CONCLUSION
Based on the classification of programs used in this overview, different messages emerge for
each category. In considering the more traditional approach of ‘earmarking resources’ to specific
health issues, the programs show that even with modest sums of investment health outcomes can
be improved. But targeting of objectives based on the needs of the population and the capacity of
the resources available is critical to success. The set of insurance programs in the second
category of ‘changing incentives’ demonstrate that insurance can be provided in low-income
settings. However, some amount of public subsidy will be required to ensure premiums are
affordable and the program remains financial viable. In considering the evidence on other
programs in this category, in general the idea behind this category - changing incentives is
successful in improving health outcomes and this rationale has great potential for application in
different settings. Based on the evaluations in the EIHP project, the final category - finding new
ways to deliver health services is an attractive option. School-based programs integrate health
services with existing infrastructure and provide an innovative mechanism for targeting a critical
population. However, the potential danger of crowding out the primary service must be explored.
The evaluations in this project provide a starting point for evidence-based replication of
successful programs. Caution however must be exercised in replicating programs, as success in
one program setting does not necessarily extend to other regions or countries. Care must be28
exercised during design and implementation by taking into local conditions, cost structures and
administrative capacities to implement programs. Implementation however is critical to success
and this body of evidence provides examples as a useful starting point. When reviewing the
evidence on evaluations and looking for winners for replication, therefore, the best approach
maybe to grasp the rationale and the underlying idea of a program and customize it to suit the
conditions it is being implemented in, rather than focusing on the specifics.29
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Table 1: The EIHP Programs
Program Country Health Issue Implementing
Agency
Safe Motherhood Program China Maternal Care Government
Reproductive Health
Capacity
Vietnam Maternal Care Government
The PARSalud Program Peru Maternal Health Government
Mother and Infant Health
Project
Ukraine Maternal Health Government
Safe Motherhood Hospital
Program
Thailand Maternal Health Government
Alcohol Based Hand
Sanitizers
Colombia Child health Pilot randomized
evaluation








Family Planning Program Iran Healthcare
Delivery
Government











India Health Insurance Local initiative
National Health Insurance
Scheme
Ghana Health Insurance Government
Social Security Health
Insurance








Malawi Malaria International NGO











HIV Counseling and Testing
Thailand HIV/AIDS Pilot randomized
evaluation32
Table 2: Family Health Programs
Program Country Costs (US$)
Family Health Program Brazil 30 - 50
Health Services Extension Program Ethiopia 15 (construction)
0.40 (salary)
Safe Motherhood Program China 0.13
Costs per year per individual (US$)
2
Table 3: Costs of Insurance Programs
($ per member/year)
Program Country Government Contribution Premium
Social Security Health Insurance Nicaragua 0 176
National Health Insurance Ghana 2.5% Sales Tax 8.00
Community Based Health Insurance India 1.00 2.40
2 Authors’ calculation based on information contained in the three studies.